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Privacy versus Antidiscrimination 
 
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz* 
 
Abstract: 
 
This essay argues that there is often an essential conflict between information privacy 
protections and antidiscrimination principles. Where information privacy law or 
practical obscurity deprives an employer of pertinent information about a job applicant, 
the employer often will rely more heavily on distasteful statistical discrimination 
strategies. For example, the existing empirical evidence suggests that criminal 
background checks may benefit African American male job applicants as a whole, by 
permitting employers to sort among ex-cons and those lacking criminal records. In the 
absence of accurate criminal history information, employers concerned about keeping 
ex-offenders out of their workplace appear to hire too few African American males – 
penalizing African American males without criminal records and hiring ex-cons who are 
members of groups with low offending rates. The essay therefore argues that in the 
employment context, the government should use information policy as a supplement to 
traditional antidiscrimination law. More precisely, the government can publish 
previously private information about individuals so as to discourage decisionmakers’ 
reliance on problematic proxies. An important implication of this insight is that there 
may be strong antidiscrimination rationales for Megan’s Laws, more recent efforts by a 
handful of jurisdictions to make general criminal history information freely available on 
the Internet, and government subsidies for programs that make employee’s prior work 
evaluations easily available to prospective employers. The essay further explains why in 
those settings where the reintegration of ex-cons into the workplace creates societal 
benefits, information privacy protections for criminal history status will rarely, if ever, be 
the most appropriate tool for achieving those benefits. The essay concludes by identifying 
situations in which publishing previously private information about individuals would be 
a poor strategy for decreasing the prevalence of discrimination.  
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 Thanks to the adoption of Megan’s Laws in all fifty states and the rise of a large 
background check industry that caters to employers, landlords, lenders, and other 
important decisionmakers, information about criminal histories is becoming more 
accessible than ever before. The same is true of financial information, such as bankruptcy 
records, credit records, and other evidence of past financial distress. Google and other 
search engines have made it easier for decisionmakers to locate other information about 
individuals that may have some bearing on their fitness for a job, an apartment, a loan, or 
another opportunity. For the most part, information privacy scholars have bemoaned 
these developments.1 Privacy critics have responded by suggesting that the availability of 
this information results in more accurate decisions about hiring, and that efforts to use 
privacy law to block the dissemination of this information will compromise economic 
efficiency. 
 This paper seeks to add one important argument to the debate over the 
proliferation of information about individuals’ involvement in the criminal justice 
system, financial distress, or other embarrassing activities. It suggests that by increasing 
the availability of information about individuals, we can reduce decisionmakers’ reliance 
on information about groups. Put another way, there is often an essential conflict between 
information privacy protections and antidiscrimination principles, such that reducing 
privacy protections will reduce the prevalence of distasteful statistical discrimination. 
The paper draws heavily on a series of recent economic papers finding that in the absence 
of accurate information about individuals’ criminal histories, employers who are 
interested in weeding out those with criminal records will rely instead on racial and 
gender proxies.  
                                                 
1 For some examples of work in this vein, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, 
and Privacy on the Internet (book manuscript in progress, on-file with author); Julie E. Cohen, Examined 
Lives: Information Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373 (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, 
The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 461 (2000); Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Quixotics Unite! Engaging the 
Pragmatists on Rational Discrimination, in Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond 318 
(David Lyon ed. 2006). Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 393 (2002); Matthew 
J. Hodge, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the “New” Internet: Facebook.Com 
and Myspace.Com, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 95 (2006). For a more optimistic take, see DAVID BRIN, THE 
TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 
(1998). 
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 In framing this project, it is worth identifying my priors at the outset. I care about 
information privacy protections. But I care more about antidiscrimination protections. 
Were it possible to sacrifice information privacy interests to reduce the prevalence of 
racial discrimination or other forms of unlawful discrimination, that is a tradeoff that I 
would be willing to make, particularly where the information privacy interests at stake 
implicate neither intimate association nor political association. Some readers may not 
share that hierarchy of interests, but my goal in this project is to help advocates of greater 
information privacy protections recognize all the collateral consequences of those 
policies. 
I. The Tradeoff between Privacy and Antidiscrimination 
  
 Newspaper reporters have recently noticed the difficulties that African American 
professionals in big cities encounter when trying to hire a nanny. Young couples 
expressed frustration that among nannies, African American clients were widely seen as 
being too demanding, living in unsafe neighborhoods, or unable to pay as much as white 
couples.2 Perhaps most frustrating of all: these stereotypes seemed to be shared by 
nannies of all races, including African-Americans and Caribbeans.3 Similar phenomena 
have been used to explain the difficulties that African American professionals have 
hailing cabs successfully – African American riders are viewed as less safe passengers 
and poorer tippers.4 Waiters similarly perceive African Americans as poor tippers, an 
expectation that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy if African Americans receive less 
attentive service as a result.5  
 Racial animus explains some of this behavior, but in the standard narrative, 
statistical discrimination is doing most of the work.6 That is, nannies are looking for good 
employers and associate race with employer quality. After all, if African American 
                                                 
2 Jodi Kantor, Nanny Hunt Can Be a Slap in the Face for Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2006, at 1. 
3 Id. 
4 On taxi tipping, see Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 Yale 
L.J. 1613, 1648-53 (2005).  
5 Michael Lynn, Ethnic Differences in Tipping, 45 Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Admin. Q. 12 (2004). 
6 On statistical discrimination, see Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 228 (1986); David S. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The 
Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Geo. L.J. 1619, 1622-24, 1626-30, 1639-43 (1991); cf. Christine Jolls & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 969, 974-75 (2006) (describing implicit bias as 
a problematic decisionmaking heuristic). 
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nannies are reluctant to work for African American parents, it is hard to construct a 
compelling animus-based story about why that would be so. Along the same lines, cab 
drivers are looking for good tippers and reliable payers, and believe that passenger race 
predicts these behaviors. Statistical discrimination is based, not on irrational animus, but 
on the use of heuristics by decisionmakers who believe – correctly or not – that 
observable hallmarks of membership in a group correlates with some undesirable 
characteristic. One premise of this paper is that in modern America, statistical 
discrimination is more prevalent than animus-based racism.7 It is in many ways a more 
tempting form of discriminatory behavior, since, unlike animus-based discrimination, it 
will often be rational.   
 To illustrate how statistical discrimination plays out in contemporary society, 
suppose a person charged with hiring a sales clerk wants to avoid employing someone 
with a criminal background. A majority of employers evidently refuse to hire ex-convicts, 
and this reluctance stands in sharp contrast to their widespread willingness to hire 
members of other stigmatized groups, such as welfare recipients, GED holders, and 
applicants who had been unemployed for a year or longer.8 We can tell a number of 
stories about why this particular aversion to hiring ex-offenders is rational.9 Someone 
with a criminal conviction in his past could be less trustworthy than someone without 
such a conviction. Hiring someone with a criminal background could expose an employer 
to vicarious liability under a variety of theories, and in some job sectors it is unlawful to 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of the decline of overt discrimination, and the rise of statistical discrimination and 
implicit bias, see generally Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 St. John’s L. Rev. 899 
(2005). 
8 Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Former Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background 
Checks, and Their Determinants, in Imprisoning America: The Social Effects of Mass Incarceration 205, 
210-11 (Russell Sage Found. 2004) (“Approximately 92 percent of employers indicated that they would 
definitely or probably hire former or current welfare recipients, 96 percent indicated that they would 
probably or definitely hire workers with a GED in lieu of a high school diploma, 59 percent indicated that 
they would hire workers with a spotty employment history, and 83 percent indicated that they would 
probably or definitely consider an application from an individual who has been unemployed for a year or 
more. In contrast, only 38 percent of employers said that they definitely or probably would accept an 
application from an [sic] former offender.”). 
9 For an illuminating discussion of the legal and moral issues implicated by this sort, and other sorts, of 
profiling, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES AND STEREOTYPES 16-17, 155-223 (Belknap 
Press 2003). 
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hire someone with a felony conviction.10 In any event, assuming the decisionmaker lacks 
reliable access to information about applicants’ criminal records, he might choose to hire 
a Caucasian female over an equally qualified African American male, based on the 
relatively high percentage of African American males and the relatively low percentage 
of Caucasian females who are involved in the criminal justice system. This 
decisionmaking process will impose a distasteful form of collective punishment on 
African American males who have had no run-ins with the law, penalizing them for 
crimes that others have committed. Because many decisionmakers may exercise the same 
decisionmaking criteria, a law-abiding African American male may face repeated 
rejection and economic marginalization.11 For these reasons, antidiscrimination law 
prohibits the use of these race or gender proxies even where race or gender might 
correlate with some relevant qualification.12 
 Policing statistical discrimination has proved difficult: many victims of this sort 
of discrimination never bring suit, many non-victims do bring suit, and enforcement of 
the laws by the Justice Department and state attorneys general has been sporadic.13 
Concerned about an avalanche of claims, a number of appellate courts have imposed 
substantial burdens on plaintiffs seeking to enforce antidiscrimination laws, often 
hamstringing discovery, interpreting statutes of limitations aggressively, or hastening 
resolution of claims on summary judgment.14  
 
 A. Empirical Evidence of Statistical Discrimination 
 
                                                 
10 Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records, 
20 J. Contemporary Crim. Justice 276, 277 (2004). 
11 Strauss, supra note 6, at 1626-29; cf. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1976). 
12 See Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 
463 U.S. 1073, 1085 n.15 (1983); Strauss, supra note 6, at 1623. 
13 See, e.g., Francis Carleton & Jennifer Nutt Carleton, An Ethic of Care Applied: A Critical Analysis of 
Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 8 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rights L. Rev. 87, 109-110 (1998); Stephen L. Ross 
& John Yinger, Uncovering Discrimination: A Comparison of the Methods Used by Scholars and Civil 
Rights Enforcement Officials, 8 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 562 (2006). 
14 See, e.g. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., __ U.S. ___ (May 29, 2007), available in 2007 WL 
1528298 (construing the time limit for filing employment discrimination claims with the EEOC narrowly); 
Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338-339, (2d Cir. 2000); (holding that despite potential disparate 
impact, law enforcement stopping suspects on the basis of gender and race did not violate equal protection 
absent evidence of discriminatory racial animus). Matt Graves, Note, Purchasing While Black: How Courts 
Condone Discrimination in the Marketplace, 7 Mich. J. Race & L. 159, 185 (2001) 
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 A fascinating recent paper in the Journal of Law and Economics by Holzer, 
Raphael, and Stoll illustrates the prevalence of statistical discrimination and the failure of 
antidiscrimination laws to curtail it.15 The paper began by noting that 28 percent of 
African American males, 16 percent of Hispanic males, and 4 percent of white males 
would be incarcerated at some point in their lives, and that the median prison sentence 
was less than 2 years.16 As a result, Holzer and co-authors observed that a sizable 
minority of the male labor pool in the United States consists of people with criminal 
records.17 The study then surveyed employers about their most recent hire for a position 
that did not require a college degree.18 The authors collected demographic information 
about each firm’s most recent hire and information about the firm’s willingness to hire 
employees with criminal records generally.  
 The findings of the study suggested that statistical discrimination against African 
Americans males is widespread, and that employers were using race as a proxy for 
involvement in the criminal justice system. Employers who conducted criminal 
background checks on applicants were more than 50% more likely to hire African 
Americans than employers who did not (24% versus 14.8%, respectively). Consistent 
with the statistical discrimination hypothesis, the effect was highly significant for 
employers who expressed unwillingness to hire ex-offenders (10.7% greater likelihood) 
and only marginally significant for employers who stated their willingness to hire ex-
offenders (4.8% greater likelihood.)19 The effects for African American males were far 
greater than the effects for African American females,20 which is consistent with the 
statistical discrimination hypothesis and hard to square with a racial animus hypothesis. 
Further, the study found the same effects even after controlling for differences in the 
racial composition of the applicant pool.21 The study also found evidence that surveyed 
                                                 
15 Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring 
Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & Econ. 451 (2006). 
16 Id. at 451. 
17 Id.; see also Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 Am. J. Soc. 937, 938 (2003) (noting that 
approximately 8% of the working-aged population of the United States are ex-felons). 
18 Holzer et al., supra note 15, at 464. 
19 Id. at 464-65. 
20 Id. at 465-66, 470-71. 
21 Id. at 474. 
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employers who do not conduct criminal background checks used other proxies for 
criminal convictions as well, including spotty work history and being unemployed for 
more than a year, and that those employers who expressed unwillingness to hire ex-
offenders were significantly less likely to hire members of these stigmatized groups.22 
 Surveying their results, the study authors reached the following conclusion about 
the effects of statistical discrimination on African American job applicants: 
[T]he empirical estimates indicate that employers who perform criminal 
background checks are more likely to hire black applicants than employers 
that do not. . . . [T]his positive net effect indicates that the adverse 
consequences of employer-initiated background checks on the likelihood 
of hiring African Americans is more than offset by the positive effect of 
eliminating statistical discrimination. . . .  
 In addition, we find that the positive effect of criminal background 
checks on the likelihood that an employer hires a black applicant is larger 
among firms that are unwilling to hire ex-offenders. This pattern is 
consistent with the proposition that employers with a particularly strong 
aversion to ex-offenders may be more likely to overestimate the 
relationship between criminality and race and hence hire too few African 
Americans as a result.23 
The implications of the study and of similar studies on the employment market by the 
same authors, are horrifying, but they should not be surprising. Many employers wish to 
avoid hiring ex-offenders. Employers who expend resources on criminal background 
checks will be able to sort effectively among those African Americans who have had run-
ins with law enforcement and those who have not, but other employers will rely on race 
as a proxy for criminality, imposing a distasteful sanction on law-abiding African 
American males. According to the Holzer study, information privacy protections for ex-
cons seem likely to harm African American males as a whole, because they thwart 
employers’ ability to sort between those African American males who have criminal 
records and those who do not.24 
                                                 
22 Id. at 472. 
23 Id. at 474. One of the authors of this study recently hedged this conclusion somewhat, noting that the 
desirability of promoting access to criminal records would depend on the amount of time for which a prior 
conviction would act as a reliable proxy for future conduct, and the degree of nuance in employer reactions 
to prior convictions. Steven Raphael, Should Criminal History Records Be Universally Available?, 5 
Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 512, 516-17, 519-20 (2006). 
24 Holzer et al., supra note , at 474. 
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 The Holzer et al. research comprises the most technically impressive papers to 
tackle this particular issue, but they are not the only scholars to examine these questions. 
A handful of other papers have examined the effects of increased automation of criminal 
history records on the aggregate employment of ex-offenders and racial minorities, and 
they reached divergent conclusions. Keith Finlay, a graduate student in Economics at UC 
Irvine, concluded in an unpublished paper that the automation of criminal history records 
and their availability on the Internet in some states was associated with a decrease in the 
employment of young African American males of slightly more than 2%.25 These results 
were statistically significant. By contrast, Shawn Bushway, a Professor of Criminology at 
SUNY-Albany, used essentially the same data set,26 and found that African Americans 
have higher wages in those states that have automated access to criminal history records 
to the greatest degree, and he attributes this finding to statistical discrimination in those 
states that have not automated access.27 Unlike Finlay, Bushway found that access to 
criminal history records did reduce the differential between whites’ wages and blacks’ 
wages and the differential between whites and black employment levels, but the results 
were not statistically significant.28 There were minor methodological differences between 
the two papers that probably explain the differing results.29 More puzzling is a follow-up 
unpublished paper that Finlay recently posted on the Internet, which finds that wages for 
ex-offenders are significantly lower in states with more accessible criminal records,30 that 
the wages of black male non-offenders are lower in states with more accessible criminal 
                                                 
25 Keith Finlay, Employer Access to Criminal History Data and the Employment of Young Black Men 22-
24 (unpublished paper, Sep. 5, 2006). 
26 Finlay and Bushway both used employment data from the Current Population Survey, though the years 
they selected differed, and a ranking of Internet accessibility of criminal history records prepared by the 
Legal Action Center in 2004. Finlay used the Legal Action Center’s rankings as a starting point, and 
supplemented them with his own estimates of when the publication of criminal history information began. 
Although the Legal Action Center’s ratings attempted to report the relative degree of accessibility, Finlay 
appears to have transformed accessibility into a binary choice. See Finlay, supra note 25, at 30 notes a & b. 
Bushway, by contrast, did not modify the Legal Action Center’s rankings. See Bushway, supra note 10, at 
288.  
27 Bushway, supra note 10, at 282 (summarizing the findings of his 1996 dissertation).  
28 Id. at 287. 
29 In addition to the differences mentioned in note 26, Bushway focused on African American employment 
generally and Finlay focused on young African American males. 
30 Keith Finlay, Effect of Employer Access to Criminal History Data on the Labor Market Outcomes of Ex-
Offenders and Non-Offenders 14 (unpublished paper, April 16, 2007). 
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records (but that the same is true for black females),31 and that “non-offenders from 
groups with higher predicted probabilities [of offending] have better employment 
outcomes in states with more open criminal history records. This is consistent with 
employer statistical discrimination in the absence of readily available criminal 
background checks.”32 Finlay’s most recent paper forthrightly concludes that it is hard to 
know what to make of statistical discrimination in employment in light of the inconsistent 
nature of his findings and incompleteness of the data.33  
 Reflecting on the Finlay and Bushway research, I suspect that neither author’s 
work sheds much light on the subject because both authors are using a noisy data set, and 
one that is difficult to replicate.34 Finlay and Bushway both emphasize the differences 
among jurisdictions in the availability of criminal history information. But because a 
large number of proprietary firms make national criminal record searches available for a 
small fee, it is not clear how much of a difference actually exists between the open-
records and closed-records states that those scholars identify. Indeed, open records does 
not mean free access. Washington state, characterized by Finlay as an open-records 
jurisdiction, does make criminal history records available over the Internet, but at a cost 
of $10 per search.35 It is plausible that most Washington-based employers would prefer to 
pay a commercial data broker $30 or $40 to search criminal records nationally, as 
opposed to $10 to search records in one state. If that is the case, then the difference 
between open-records and closed-records jurisdictions will be too noisy a variable.  
 To sum up the available data, then, the Holzer et al. research is the best 
information we have, and it suggests that employer access to criminal history information 
displaces statistical discrimination against African American males. There is noisier 
research out there, which tries to determine what effects interstate variation in the 
availability of criminal history records have on employment, but the results are 
preliminary, ambiguous, and many of them have not yet survived peer review. It 
                                                 
31 Id. at 16. 
32 Id. at 18.  
33 Id. at 19. 
34 The Legal Action Center index of Internet availability that both authors use is no longer available on the 
Center’s web site.  
35 See https://watch.wsp.wa.gov/. 
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therefore seems appropriate to tentatively accept Holzer et al.’s findings as the current 
state of the art, while recognizing that future economic research will shed more light on 
this important question and could prompt reconsideration. 
 
B. Government Information Policy as a Supplement to Antidiscrimination 
Law 
 
 Given the deleterious consequences of the employer behavior that Holzer et al. 
find, it is worth examining the possible avenues, other than ex-post litigation, for the state 
to prevent statistical discrimination. One way to protect African Americans and other 
disadvantaged groups would be to make them appear indistinguishable from whites. 
Indeed, some efforts to reform antidiscrimination law have suggested that statistical 
discrimination can be mitigated if the relevant decisionmakers are deprived of 
information about a candidates’ race, religion, or gender.36 With less information, 
decisionmakers presumably will focus more on the black and white of a job applicant’s 
resume, and less on the black or white of the applicant’s skin. Related efforts, such as the 
Racial Privacy Initiative that was defeated at the polls in California in 2003, ostensibly 
sought to decrease racial discrimination by prohibiting the government from collecting 
information about individuals’ race, so that the government could not disseminate that 
information at a later date or act upon it.37 
 In the information age, we should consider approaching the statistical 
discrimination problem from the opposite direction: using the government to help provide 
decisionmakers with something that approximates complete information about each 
applicant, so that readily discernable facts like race or gender will not be overemphasized 
and more obscure but relevant facts, like past job performance and social capital, will 
loom larger.  
 For example, the government might subsidize the creation of information 
clearinghouses, so that employee evaluations from prior employers can be aggregated in 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1, 14-16 (2000) (discussing orchestral auditions, in which a screen separates the judges from the 
auditioning musician); cf. Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to 
Protect Public Records, 116 Yale L.J. 1350-1352 (2007) (proposing that the government try to limit 
landlords’ access to information regarding tenants’ prior involvement in landlord-tenant litigation). 
37 For an interesting discussion and critique of this initiative, see Anita L. Allen, Race, Face, and Rawls, 72 
Fordham L. Rev. 1677, 1686-96 (2004). 
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one place; it might use tax incentives to encourage the collection of 360 degree feedback 
about employees within firms, so that one boss’s negative opinion of a former employee 
is not given too much weight; the state might publish information about all individuals’ 
involvement (or lack thereof) in the criminal justice or bankruptcy systems; it might 
publish military records that document individuals’ performance and conduct while in the 
service; or it might verify and vouch for applicant’s educational credentials.38 
 On this theory, a major factor driving unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
race, ethnic status, gender, or religion is a lack of verifiable information about the 
individual seeking a job, home, or service. By making the publication of criminal 
histories tortious,39 restricting the ability of information data brokers to disseminate 
information about individuals,40 or raising the media’s costs of obtaining aggregated 
criminal history information that is already in the government’s hands,41 information 
privacy protections undermine antidiscrimination principles. The tradeoff makes privacy 
                                                 
38 Richard Epstein notes in passing the desirability of such efforts, and complains that antidiscrimination 
law sometimes thwarts them. RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION GROUNDS 40 (1992) (“The strategy of law should be to encourage employers to obtain as 
much individual information as possible about workers so that they can, pro tanto, place less reliance on 
broad statistical judgments. To the extent, therefore, that the present antidiscrimination law imposes 
enormous restrictions on the use of testing, interviews, and indeed any information that does not perfectly 
individuate workers, then by indirection it encourages the very sorts of discrimination that the law seeks to 
oppose.”). In addition to developing Epstein’s insight in far more detail, my analysis differs from his in two 
important respects. First, I identify ways in which the government can now affirmatively gather and publish 
information about individuals as a means of combating statistical discrimination. Second, whereas Epstein 
favors the repeal of antidiscrimination laws, see id. at 3, I support their continued enforcement, but view 
government information policy as a useful supplement to them. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1834, 1889-94 (2006); cf. Strauss, 
supra note , at 1641-42 (“[S]tatistical discrimination can be reduced if employers are provided with reliable 
information about employees. This should be a principal objective of any regulatory regime in this area. 
Ordinarily, one excellent way to learn about an employer’s qualifications is to hire him or her.”). 
39 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931). 
40 This was one result of the FTC’s actions following the ChoicePoint data privacy breach. ChoicePoint got 
into hot water after identity thieves signed up as its customers and obtained a wealth of financial data 
concerning individuals. Pursuant to a consent decree, ChoicePoint agreed to begin checking the credentials 
of its customers, visiting their places of business, and auditing their practices. See United States of America 
v. ChoicePoint Inc., Consent Decree (N.D. Ga. 2006), available at  
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf (visited June 29, 2007). Subsequently, 
ChoicePoint stopped doing business with small companies, and began doing business exclusively with 
large firms. See Aviva Litan, Case Study: ChoicePoint Incident Leads to Improved Security, Others Must 
Follow, Gartner RAS Core Research NOTE 600142771 (Sep. 19, 2006), available at 
http://www.choicepoint.net/news/choicepoint_1996.pdf 
41 See, e.g., United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 
(1989) (holding that criminal rap sheets are exempt from disclosure under FOIA because their 
dissemination would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy).  
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law and institutional arrangements that obscure information about individual’s 
reputations far more problematic than courts and theorists presently suppose.  
  
II. Pragmatic Concerns 
 
 Governmental disclosures of previously private information will substantially 
enhance antidiscrimination strategies when two basic conditions are satisfied. First, 
statistical discriminators must significantly outnumber animus-based discriminators. 
Second, the information that the government is disseminating must be relatively accurate.  
 
A. Animus Based Discriminators 
 
 The problem of pretext is daunting in the antidiscrimination context. A 
decisionmaker adopts a policy because it has a discriminatory effect, and then insists that 
the policy is actually motivated by benign considerations. Sorting among the pretextual 
and legitimate justifications for such a policy is one of the more difficult tasks faced by 
courts adjudicating discrimination claims.42 But there are limits on the extent to which an 
intentional discriminator can hide behind a nondiscriminatory rationale. 
 Information constraints provide one such limit. If the only thing a decisionmaker 
knows about a job or apartment applicant is his race, then it is quite difficult to identify a 
nondiscriminatory basis for excluding him. If, on the other hand, the decisionmaker has a 
wealth of information about an applicant, then it will be easier to identify some 
seemingly neutral characteristic that formed the basis for exclusion. As long as the 
decisionmaker can remember to exclude contemporaneous applicants who have that same 
characteristic, the decisionmaker likely will be able to convince the court that there was a 
non-pretextual basis for exclusion. 
 Recall that this paper is premised on the idea that animus-based discrimination is 
less prevalent than statistical discrimination. Yet there are surely still many 
decisionmakers who are motivated by animus, and it is possible that this form of 
                                                 
42 Kenneth Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 
71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 503 (1996).  
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discrimination remains more prevalent in some contexts.43 Where animus-based 
discrimination predominates, a government strategy to provide decisionmakers with more 
previously private information about job applicants, apartment seekers, jurors, or students 
will make it easier for decisionmakers to rebut allegations of pretext. In those settings, the 
gains from decreased statistical discrimination often would be exceeded by the losses 
associated with easier animus-based discrimination.44 
 
B. False Information 
 
 Efforts to combat statistical discrimination via government information policy 
will only accomplish laudable objectives to the extent that the information disseminated 
is accurate. Some of the information discussed herein – military records, records of 
criminal convictions, bankruptcy records, immigration and naturalization documents, and 
the like – will not pose unmanageable accuracy problems. To be sure, any system that 
relies on the government to produce accurate information will produce errors, but perhaps 
the best way to detect and correct those errors will be to make the information available 
to the privacy subjects, as the European Union has done,45 so that the subjects of the 
information can dispute inaccuracies. To the extent that more stubborn errors occur, they 
will often resolve around cases of mistaken identity, where someone sharing the same 
name as another person with an undesirable characteristic is thereby penalized.46 These 
problems can be ameliorated through the use of supplemental identifiers other than 
names, such as birthdates, birth places, and partial Social Security Numbers. And the 
related problem of identity theft can be addressed through a combination of criminal 
enforcement and increased reliance on photographs, fingerprints, retinal scans, and other 
                                                 
43 The issue of implicit bias adds further complexity, as a decisionmaker may be acting on the basis of 
animus but not realize he is doing so. See Moran, supra note 7, at 907-10. For the purposes of this paper, 
conscious animus-based racism and implicit bias should be grouped together. 
44 I use the word “often” here, rather than “invariably,” because of the possibility that increased reliance on 
reputational information will facilitate automated decisionmaking, which could in turn employ algorithms 
that draw decisionmakers away from the influences of animus. This argument is made in Tal Z. Zarsky, 
“Mine Your Own Business!”: Making The Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal 
Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 Yale J.L. & Tech. 4, § II.B (2003). 
45 See, e.g., European Directive on the Protection of Personal Data 95/46/EC Article 12 
46 This is a recurring problem with the Department of Homeland Security’s no-fly and restricted lists. See 
also Kleysteuber, supra note 36, at 1358-59 (discussing this problem in the context of tenant information 
databases). 
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verification technologies. These tradeoffs are familiar: Decreased privacy buys us a 
reduction in individuals being subjected to inappropriate treatment. 
 The more daunting false information problems arise in the context of data that is 
not contained in existing public records, but rather is the product of government efforts to 
facilitate wider availability of information about individuals. For example, if the 
government does try to improve the efficiency of the labor market by subsidizing the 
collection of 360 degree feedback and making that feedback transportable across firms, 
then it will have to deal with deliberately or unintentionally false feedback that employee 
A provides about employee B. Critically, if an employer relies heavily on co-worker 
evaluations in deciding not to hire a seemingly qualified applicant, but those evaluations 
are themselves the product of co-worker animus or implicit bias, then the government 
strategy might be counterproductive.47 
 Nobody believes that the inaccurate feedback problem can be solved entirely in 
reputation-tracking environments. But, as I have written elsewhere, there are strong 
reasons to believe that the problems can be ameliorated significantly through the use of 
algorithms designed to locate outlier data points, along with spot-checks and audits 
relying on objective verification.48 Given enough information, these algorithms can 
identify instances where an individual provides suspiciously high levels of negative 
feedback toward members of an identifiable racial or gender group. Once identified, the 
system can then adjust the weight assigned to such feedback, substantially offsetting the 
harm done by feedback that is tainted by animus or implicit bias.  
 It is sometimes tempting to use the imperfections in feedback systems as a basis 
for rejecting their use. But the appropriate contrast is not between a world of perfectly 
accurate information about individuals and the sometimes flawed information that can be 
generated by an eBay-style reputation tracking mechanism. There are massive false 
feedback problem equivalents in the real world. A poor man buys one expensive suit to 
appear prosperous. A debt-saddled person drives a very nice car or eats at really nice 
                                                 
47 On implicit bias, see, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral 
Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063 (2006). 
48 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (And Everything?), 81 NYU L. REV. 1699 
(2006). 
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restaurants to appear well off. A middle aged person has plastic surgery to appear young. 
An individual fakes an accent to appear worldly. A would-be adulterer removes a 
wedding ring to appear unmarried. Reputation tracking systems like eBay’s, Slashdot’s, 
Tripadvisor’s, and Digg’s introduce some false feedback, but because most providers of 
feedback are sincere, and algorithms can help the purveyors or users of these sites weigh 
more heavily the feedback provided by reviewers who have proven their reliability, their 
signal to noise ratios are often quite high.  
 
III. Normative Considerations 
 
 In this part I will touch upon some of the normative decisions that will help 
determine at what point society should embrace the sorts of policy options developed 
herein. As the reader will quickly discern, this section takes the objectives of existing 
antidiscrimination law as a given, and asks what information dissemination policies 
should follow from that premise. 
 
 A. When Is Government Publicity for Previously Private Information   
  Desirable? 
 
 The preceding discussion suggests that it may be desirable for the government to 
facilitate the availability of previously private information about individuals so as to 
prevent statistical discrimination on the basis of suspect classifications. The implicit 
normative assumption is that if decisionmakers are going to try to exclude people with 
undesirable characteristics – criminal records, say – it is better that they identify those 
with criminal records using accurate criminal history information than via a less reliable 
and more troubling proxy for criminal backgrounds, such as race or gender. Employment 
discrimination against those with criminal records may have social costs, but it has social 
benefits as well, and the decision to tolerate such discrimination, be it in housing, 
employment, or educational settings, presently commands broad societal support. 
 There will be other “undesirable” but unobservable characteristics where the 
social consensus is quite different. Take, for example, HIV-positive status. HIV positive 
individuals are protected against discriminatory treatment by antidiscrimination laws. Yet 
some employers may still prefer to keep HIV-positive individuals out of their 
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workplaces, for reasons rational (e.g., concerns about rising group health insurance 
premiums) or irrational (stubborn concerns about the possibility of HIV transmission via 
casual contact). In the United States, the HIV virus historically has been 
disproportionately prevalent among homosexual men, with male-to-male sexual contact 
remaining the predominant method by which HIV positive Americans contracted the 
disease.49 In recent years, infection rates have risen particularly sharply among African 
Americans.50  
 Given the substantial stigma associated with HIV and the relatively high costs of 
providing health insurance for HIV-positive employees, it is likely that homosexual men 
and African Americans generally are victimized by statistical discrimination designed to 
keep HIV positive individuals out of the work place. One possible strategy for combating 
this statistical discrimination would be to publicize the HIV status of every American. 
That would be a bad idea. As demonstrated by the Americans with Disabilities Act, and a 
number of common law decisions treating HIV status as a “private fact” whose disclosure 
is highly offensive to a reasonable person,51 Americans have decided that HIV status 
itself ought to be a protected classification, and decisions classifying individuals on the 
basis of HIV status may be as bad, or nearly as bad, as decisions classifying them on the 
basis of race. Indeed, the current absence of antidiscrimination protections for 
homosexuals (at least under federal law) suggests that disclosing HIV status to prevent 
statistical discrimination against gays would be perceived as swallowing the spider to 
catch the fly. Involvement in the criminal justice system is a very different attribute than 
HIV status, and courts recently have become less sympathetic to privacy claims involving 
the dissemination of the plaintiff’s criminal history.52  
                                                 
49 See Centers for Disease Control, Cases of HIV Infection in the United States and Dependent Areas, 2005, 
available at <http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/reports/2005report/commentary.htm>.  
50 See Centers for Disease Control, Fighting HIV among African Americans: A Heightened National 
Response, 2007, available at  
<http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/aa/resources/factsheets/pdf/AA_response_media_fact.pdf> (reporting that 
African Americans made up 51% of HIV diagnoses between 2001 and 2005, with the rate of HIV 
diagnoses among black men nearly seven times higher than that of white men).. 
51 See, e.g., Multimedia, WMAZ v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. App. 1994); Hillman v. Columbia 
County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 922 (Wis. 1991). 
52 See, e.g., Gates v. Discovery Communications, 34 Cal.4th 679, 696 (2004); Sadiq Reza, Privacy And The 
Criminal Arrestee Or Suspect: In Search Of A Right, In Need Of A Rule, 64 Md. L. Rev. 755, 762-63 
(2005); but cf. Norris v. King, 355 So.2d 21, 23-25 (La. App. 1978) (reaching a contrary result, but relying 
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 In short, when existing laws and norms tolerate the publication of information 
about an individual’s attributes, and when in the absence of such information 
decisionmakers may statistically discriminate using a legally suspect classification 
system, the government should publish the information in question or facilitate its 
widespread availability. But the government should not publish information showing who 
is a member of a protected class, such as HIV patients, pregnant women, Mormons, and 
the like, even if the resulting statistical discrimination reduces the opportunities available 
to HIV-negative homosexual men, non-pregnant women, or non-Mormon residents of 
Utah.   
 
B. Incidence 
 
 The discussion so far has been premised on the idea that it is desirable to help 
law-abiding African American males at the expense of African American males with 
criminal records. To defend that proposition, it is worth exploring the counterarguments – 
namely, why someone might want to make it more difficult for private decisionmakers to 
sort among those with criminal records and those without criminal records. There are 
several possible justifications for this approach. First, we might expect that those with 
criminal records will be harmed more than those without criminal records will be helped. 
Accordingly, facilitating effective private sorting will make job applicants as a whole 
worse off. Second, we might believe that there are powerful policy justifications for 
preventing sorting, perhaps because we believe that criminals who have served their time 
deserve a clean slate. Third, we might believe that the criminal justice system is 
essentially corrupt, in which case facilitating sorting merely enhances the unjust penalties 
meted out by an arbitrary government apparatus. Of these three arguments, only the last 
one has significant force. I will consider them in turn. 
 First, the best available empirical evidence suggests that African American males 
are more likely to be hired by firms that conduct criminal background checks than by 
similarly situated firms that do not. Recall that Holzer and his co-authors found that those 
responsible for hiring appeared to overestimate the propensity of African American males 
                                                                                                                                                 
on a California precedent that Gates overruled). The Supreme Court held decades ago that it was not 
unconstitutional for the government to disseminate information about a shoplifter’s prior arrests. See Paul 
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). 
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to have criminal records, and hire too few African Americans as a consequence.53 
Publicizing accurate information about individuals’ involvement in the criminal justice 
system should only adversely affect a group’s available opportunities to the extent that 
decisionmakers (a) underestimate the prevalence of criminal records among members of 
a particular group, or (b) are effectively prevented from engaging in statistical 
discrimination to sort out those with criminal records. The Holzer study undercuts both 
claims, though some of Finlay’s unpublished research supports the former claim.  
 Alternatively, we might think that private sorting creates negative externalities, 
and justify keeping criminal histories obscure for that reason. For example, we might 
believe on policy grounds that the availability of employment opportunities for ex-cons 
will discourage recidivism. Alternatively, we might have an abstract ideological 
commitment to the proposition that “everyone deserves a second chance,” or, more 
narrowly, that “someone who has served his time has repaid his debt to society and 
should be able to start off with a clean slate.” These sorts of arguments sometimes find 
their way into the information privacy case law and academic literature.54 In this case, the 
appropriate question to ask is what is the optimal strategy for preventing these negative 
externalities. We can answer this question by drawing on the tools of optimal 
redistribution analysis.  
 The appropriate way to facilitate the hiring of ex-cons who deserve a second 
chance is through direct subsidies to employers who hire them. Such programs have been 
implemented, with the discontinued federal Targeted Jobs Tax Credit providing one 
example55 and the current federal tax code’s Work Opportunity Credit providing 
another.56 Implicit tax subsidies to organizations whose missions involve reintegrating 
                                                 
53 Holzer et al., supra note 15, at 474; see also Holzer et al., supra note 8, at 227 (“[E]mployers may 
overestimate the average of incidence of prior conviction among blacks, owing to prejudice or a general 
lack of experience with black employees.”). 
54 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. 1931); 
James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. St. Thomas L.J. 387, 
406-12 (2006); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record 
Predict Future Offending?, 5 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 483, 498-99 (2006). 
55 See George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, 11 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 225, 291-92 (1994). 
56 26 U.S.C. § 51(D)(1)(c) 
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ex-offenders back into the social and economic mainstream would work similarly well.57 
Alternatively, we can envision government programs to insure employers against the 
possible downsides of hiring ex-offenders. Because it is inexpensive for the government 
to identify ex-cons, the government can efficiently ensure that only genuine ex-cons 
benefit from the subsidized second chances. And since the tax subsidy or insurance 
programs would be funded out of general tax revenues, the costs of promoting second 
chances is borne by taxpayers as a whole. Compare that regime to the status quo. We try 
to facilitate the hiring of ex-cons by raising private decisionmakers’ costs of sorting 
between ex-cons and those with no criminal records. As a result, many employers 
evidently use statistical discrimination tools to penalize non-ex-cons, and the ex-cons 
who do get hired are likely to be members of groups whose baseline offending rates are 
low – white males, and females of all races. Under the present system, only some of the 
beneficiaries of the existing “promote second chances through information obscurity” 
program are actually ex-cons, and the costs of this policy fall heavily on a group that 
includes other ex-cons and innocent people who share demographic characteristics with 
ex-cons. From an optimal redistribution perspective, no one should prefer our present 
approach to a tax credit.58  
 There are persuasive philosophical justifications for rejecting information policy 
as a tool for promoting the rehabilitation of ex-offenders as well. First, to the extent that 
ex-offenders are to be reintegrated into the workforce, we ought to prefer consensual 
integration over non-consensual integration. Publicizing the identities of ex-offenders and 
then providing subsidies to their employers will ensure that employers enter into these 
employment relationships willingly, rather than carelessly or via trickery. Initiating an 
employment relationship on the basis of an omission or misrepresentation hardly seems 
like a productive way to facilitate lasting trust and fidelity. If the employment 
relationship heads south, the employer will feel burned and will be more vigilant about 
screening out ex-offenders next time via criminal background checks or statistical 
discrimination. Second, as a matter of principle, it seems that the law should reveal 
                                                 
57 The Delancey Street Foundation is a particularly successful example of this type of organization. See 
<http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/grassroots/delancey/> . 
58 Notably, this sort of analysis is absent from Steven Raphael’s recent essay on the subject. See Raphael, 
supra note 23, at 515.  
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troubling inequalities, so that their root causes can be addressed by policymakers and the 
citizenry. Suppressing information about such inequality, or even failing to facilitate its 
disclosure, might reduce the chances that the underlying inequalities will be remedied.  
 The final justification for obscuring information about criminal offenses is 
connected to disturbing inequalities within the criminal justice system. More precisely, if 
the criminal justice system is systematically biased against African Americans, Latinos, 
or men, then a system whereby the government publicizes the crimes of African 
Americans, Latinos, and men will worsen existing inequality. This argument comes the 
closest to providing a compelling reason for suppressing criminal history information 
about individuals. If criminal punishments are indeed meted out arbitrarily to members of 
minority groups, then a Rawlsian should reject the proposal that I have advanced,59 
though a welfarist should not.  
 If we accept a softened version of the “arbitrary criminal justice system” thesis, 
then we certainly need not reject the approach defended here. More precisely, even in a 
nation whose criminal justice system discriminates systematically against African 
American males, there may be important, merit-related differences between those African 
American males who have criminal records and those who do not. Some of the former 
will be innocent, but surely virtually all of the latter will be innocent.   
  
IV. Conclusion or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Megan’s Law  
 
 This paper reflects a shift in my thinking about government information policy. I 
began as a skeptic of Megan’s Law, the computerization of bankruptcy records, and other 
policies whereby the government made previously private information freely available to 
the public. But I have increasingly begun to appreciate the potential for these sorts of 
policies to further social welfare and combat morally problematic statistical 
discrimination. Employers, by and large, are not going to want to hire sex offenders, and 
banks, by and large, are not going to want to lend to people with bad credit (at least not 
without charging subprime rates). If the government fails to provide employers and 
lenders with information that will enable them to sort out the sex offenders and the 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., the discussion of the difference principle in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 100-102 
(1971). 
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bankruptcy filers, then these employers and lenders will be tempted to rely on unlawful, 
but difficult to detect, statistical discrimination techniques to screen out the undesirables. 
Such subtle statistical discrimination is often more troubling that overt discrimination on 
the basis of criminal or bankruptcy history, and this analysis shows a myriad of related 
government strategies for stomping it out. In short, government information policy stands 
as a useful, and perhaps even necessary, supplement to the antidiscrimination laws’ attack 
on statistical discrimination. 
 The problem, then, with Megan’s Law and Internet availability of bankruptcy 
filings, is not that they reveal too much, but that they reveal too little. Such online 
resources should be expanded to include all criminal convictions of adults, as Colorado, 
Florida, and a handful of other states have done,60 and more documents pertaining to 
individuals’ financial distress. Indeed, much of the information in the federal 
government’s National Crime Information Center’s (NCIC) database could be brought 
on-line, made available to the general public free of charge.61 If positive spillovers result 
from the reintegration of ex-offenders or ex-insolvents into the nation’s economic and 
social life, and I suspect they do, then direct subsidies or insurance programs, not 
information privacy protections, are the appropriate policy lever for facilitating that 
reintegration.  
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60 See Jacobs, supra note 54, at 399-400. 
61 Selective access to the NCIC database currently presents problems. See Shaun B. Spencer, Security v. 
Privacy : Reframing the Debate, 79 Denv. U. L. Rev. 519, 520-21 (2002) (describing what he sees as the 
inadequate safeguards to prevent data breaches from the NCIC and other government repositories of 
information). 
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